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Do Budget Deﬁcits Cause Inﬂation?
In 2004, the federal budget deficit 
stood at $412 billion and reached 4.5 
percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP).  Though not at a record level, 
the deficit as a fraction of GDP is now 
the largest since the early 1980s. More-
over, the recent swing from surplus to 
deficit is the largest since the end of 
World War II (Figure 1). The flip side 
of deficit spending is that the amount 
of government debt outstanding rises: 
The government must borrow to 
finance the excess of its spending over 
its receipts. For the U.S. economy, the 
amount of federal debt held by the 
public as a fraction of GDP has been 
rising since the early 1970s. It now 
stands at a little over 37 percent of 
GDP (Figure 2).
For a long time, economists and 
policymakers have worried about the 
relationship between government 
budget deficits and inflation. These 
worries stem from the possibility that 
the government will finance its deficits 
by borrowing or by printing money. 
Should deficit spending and a large 
public debt be worrisome for monetary 
policymakers who are concerned about 
the economy’s level of inflation? Do 
government budget deficits lead to 
higher inflation? When looking at 
data across countries, the answer is: 
it depends. Some countries with high 
inflation also have large government 
budget deficits. This suggests a link 
between budget deficits and inflation. 
Yet for developed countries, such as 
the U.S., which tend to have relatively 
low inflation, there is little evidence 
of a tie between deficit spending and 
inflation. Why is it that budget deficits 
are associated with high inflation in 
some countries but not in others?    
The key to understanding the re-
lationship between government budget 
deficits and inflation is the recognition 
that government deficit spending is 
linked to the quantity of money cir-
culating in the economy through the 
government budget constraint, which is 
the relationship between resources and 
spending. At its most basic level, the 
budget constraint shows that money 
spent has to come from somewhere: in 
the case of local and national govern-
ments, from taxes or borrowing. But 
national governments can also use 
monetary policy to help finance the 
government’s deficit.
The extent to which monetary 
policy is used to help balance the 
government's budget is the key to 
determining the effect of budget 
deficits on inflation.  In this article, we 
will examine theory and evidence on 
the link between fiscal and monetary 




Budget constraints are a fact of 
life we all face. We’re told we can’t 
spend more than we have or more than 
we can borrow. In that sense, budget 
constraints always hold: They reflect 
the fact that when we make decisions, 
we must recognize we have limited 
resources.  
An example can help fix the idea.  
Imagine a household that gets income 
s there a relationship between government 
budget deficits and inflation? The data show 
that some countries—usually less developed 
nations—with high inflation also have large 
budget deficits. Developed countries, however, show little 
evidence of a tie between deficit spending and inflation. 
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1 The household can also sell some of its assets 
to finance consumption. This is tantamount to
negative investment in assets. 
from working and from past invest-
ments in financial assets. The house-
hold can also borrow, perhaps by using 
a credit card or getting a home-equity 
loan. The household can then spend 
the funds obtained from these sources 
to buy goods and services, such as 
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food, clothing, and haircuts. It can also 
use the funds to pay back some of its 
past borrowing and to invest in finan-
cial assets such as stocks and bonds.1  
The household’s budget constraint 
says that the sum of its income from 
working, from financial assets, and 
from what it borrows must equal its 
spending plus debt repayment, plus 
new investment in financial assets.  
There are no financial leaks in the 
budget constraint: The household’s 
sources of funds are all accounted for, 
its spending is all accounted for, and 
the two must be equal.  The household 
may use borrowing to spend more than 
it earns, but that source of funding is 
accounted for in the budget constraint.   
If the household has hit its borrowing 
limit, fully drawn down its assets, and 
spent its work wages, it has nowhere 
else to turn for funds and would there-
fore be unable to finance additional 
spending.  
Just like households, governments 
face constraints that relate spending 
to sources of funds. Governments can 
raise revenue by taxing their citizens, 
and they can borrow by issuing bonds 
to citizens and foreigners. In addition, 
governments may receive revenue from 
their central banks when new cur-
rency is issued. Governments spend 
their resources on such things as goods 
and services, transfer payments such 
as Social Security to its citizens, and 
repayment of existing debt.  Central 
banks are a potential source of financ-
ing for government spending, since the 
revenue the government gets from the 
central bank can be used to finance 
spending in lieu of imposing taxes or 
issuing new bonds. For example, the 
U.S. Treasury received a little more 
than $22 billion from the Federal 
Reserve in 2003.2      
Much of a central bank’s revenue 
comes from its monetary policy opera-
2 Recent detail on Federal Reserve payments to 
the Treasury can be found in the 90th Annual
Report, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 2003, Table 5, page 270.  28   Q3  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
tions. An important aspect of modern 
monetary policymaking is controlling 
the short-term interest rate. Central 
banks do this by purchasing and selling 
interest-earning government bonds. 
If the central bank wants to raise the 
interest rate, it sells government bonds. 
If it wants to lower the interest rate, it 
buys government bonds. As a conse-
quence of these open market operations, 
central banks have government bonds 
in their portfolios, and these bonds 
earn interest.  Thus, one component of 
central bank revenue is interest earned 
on the government bonds it holds.  
The second component of central 
bank revenue is also related to open 
market operations. Central banks 
are able to create and issue money to 
pay for the government bonds they 
purchase. The money that central 
banks create is called high-powered 
money, and it takes the form of cur-
rency held by the nonbank public plus 
the reserves banks are required to 
hold against certain types of depos-
its. Since the central bank can issue 
high-powered money to pay for things 
like government bonds, an increase 
in high-powered money represents a 
source of central bank revenue. 
Revenues are one side of the 
central bank’s budget constraint.  
What does the central bank spend its 
revenue on? As mentioned, a major 
use of funds is to purchase government 
debt in the conduct of open market 
operations.  The other component of 
central bank spending is residual: what 
is left over after the central bank pays 
its expenses. In the U.S., this residual 
gets turned over to the Treasury each 
year.   
We can get a consolidated govern-
ment budget constraint by combining 
the budget constraints of the treasury 
and the central bank.  The govern-
ment spends its revenue on:
•  Goods and services;
•  Transfer payments; and
•  Interest payments on government 
debt held by the public.3
This spending is funded by:
•  Tax receipts;
•  The increase in debt held by the 
public; and
•  The increase in high-powered 
money.  
Note that if the government 
increases the quantity of high-powered 
money it can reduce other taxes or 
borrowing.
The revenue the government 
gets from the increase in high-pow-
ered money is called seigniorage.4 
The extent to which governments 
use seigniorage as a means for financ-
ing budget deficits plays a key role in 
the link between budget deficits and 
inflation. Since the creation of high-
powered money, and thus seigniorage, 
is undertaken by the central bank, the 
consolidated budget constraint shows 
the link between fiscal policy and 
monetary policy. Money creation is a 
source of revenue for the government. 
The amount of revenue the govern-
ment gets from seigniorage has impli-
cations for the government’s choices 
about taxes, borrowing, and spending.5 
HOW MUCH CAN THE
GOVERNMENT BORROW?
 The consolidated budget con-
straint shows the link between the 
3 Recall that interest paid on government debt 
held by the central bank goes back to the trea-
sury.
4 More technically, seigniorage is the real 
increase in the stock of high-powered money 
(currency held by the nonbank public plus bank 
reserves), i.e., the increase in the stock of high-
powered money adjusted for the level of prices 
in the economy. As shown in Figure 3, for the 
U.S., this measure of seigniorage has been small. 
See the book by Frederic Mishkin. 
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5 There is also a subtle way in which govern-
ments can use monetary policy to help finance
spending. If the government can generate sur-
prise inflation, the real value of the payments 
it makes to holders of its debt falls below what 
investors expected to receive when they bought 
the debt. Surprise inflation erodes the value 
of government debt, which means that a lesser 
amount of real tax revenue must be raised to 
pay off bondholders. However, generating sur-
prise inflation to finance spending is ultimately 
a losing game for the government. Eventually, 
investors will catch on to what the government 
is doing and demand a high enough interest 
payment to compensate them adequately for the 
government’s inflation policy.         Business Review  Q3  2005   29 www.philadelphiafed.org
Monetary policy 
does not necessarily 
have to adjust money 
growth in response 
to deﬁcit spending... 
provided that deﬁcit 
spending is expected 
to be offset by future 
surpluses.
that backs government debt must be 
discounted to take account of the time 
value of money. That is, the current 
value of debt must equal the present 
discounted value of future surpluses 
and future seigniorage.8  
We call this relationship the 
government’s intertemporal budget con-
straint.9  It indicates that the govern-
ment must plan to raise enough rev-
enue (in present value terms) through 
taxation and seigniorage to pay off its 
existing debt and to pay for its planned 
expenditures on goods, services, and 
transfer payments.
The intertemporal budget con-
straint has some interesting implica-
tions for monetary and fiscal policy. 
Suppose the government decides that, 
for a set path of future spending, it will 
lower current and future taxes perma-
nently. This policy would lower the 
present discounted value of future sur-
pluses. So, to fund the path of future 
spending, the government would need 
to increase the present discounted 
government’s choices about spending, 
taxing, borrowing, and seigniorage. 
This relationship is a constraint only 
in the sense that there may be limits 
on the government’s ability to borrow 
or raise taxes. Obviously, if there were 
no such limits, there would be no con-
straint on how much the government 
could spend at any point in time.  
Certainly governments are limited 
in their ability to tax citizens. (That is, 
the government can’t tax more than 
100 percent of income.) But are gov-
ernments constrained in their ability 
to borrow? Indeed they are. Informally, 
the value of government debt out-
standing today cannot be more than 
the value of the resources the govern-
ment has to pay off the debt.6
How do governments pay their 
current debt obligations? One way is 
for the government to collect more 
tax revenue than it spends. In this 
case, the surplus can be used to pay 
bond holders. Another way to finance 
existing debt is to collect seignior-
age revenue and use that to pay bond 
holders. Finally, the government can 
borrow more from the public to pay ex-
isting debt holders. If the government 
chooses this last option, any new debt 
it issues would, in turn, have to be paid 
off using future surpluses, future sei-
gniorage, or future borrowing. As long 
as the amount of debt the government 
issues to pay its obligations does not 
grow too fast over time, we can think 
of the current value of outstanding 
government debt as being ultimately 
backed by a stream of future surpluses 
and future seigniorage.7 Since inves-
tors generally prefer to receive payouts 
sooner rather than later, the future 
stream of surpluses and seigniorage 
value of seigniorage. Since seignior-
age is related to high-powered money 
growth, the implication is that money 
growth must increase in the future. 
Similarly, if the government decides to 
permanently increase future surpluses 
— for example, a permanent increase 
in taxes or a permanent reduction in 
borrowing — so that the present dis-
counted value of future surpluses rises, 
the present discounted value of future 
seigniorage must fall; therefore, future 
money growth must fall.10
Note that the constraint does not 
say that an increase in deficits must 
be accompanied by a rise in seignior-
age. An increase in the deficit could 
be temporary in the sense that it will 
be offset by future surpluses. In other 
words, a deficit today could be negated 
by a future surplus, so that the present 
discounted value of future surpluses 
remains unchanged. In that case, no 
offsetting adjustment in the value of 
discounted future seigniorage would 
be necessary. Monetary policy does 
not necessarily have to adjust money 
growth in response to deficit spend-
ing by the government, provided that 
deficit spending is expected to be offset 
by future surpluses.  But if the present 
discounted value of future surpluses 
changes, there must be an offsetting 
change in the present discounted value 
of seigniorage, and vice versa. 
POLICY, DEFICITS, AND
INFLATION
Suppose that whenever there is a 
change in the present discounted value 
of seigniorage, fiscal policy adjusts so 
that the intertemporal budget con-
straint holds. In this case, monetary 
policy is independent in the sense that 
monetary policymakers take action 
without regard to fiscal policy, and 
then fiscal policy adjusts to maintain 
6 A formal derivation of this relationship can be 
found in the Technical Appendix. 
 
7 We have assumed that in the long run, govern-
ment debt does not grow at a rate faster than 
the interest rate.
8 Present value refers to an amount of money to-
day that will become a given amount at a stated
point in the future, depending on the interest 
rate. For example, if the interest rate is 10 per-
cent, $100 today will be worth $110 in one year. 
So the present value of $110 one year from now 
(with an interest rate of 10 percent) is $100.
9 An “intertemporal constraint” shows how gov-
ernment resources and spending are linked over
time.
10 The government can permanently increase fu-
ture surpluses by raising taxes or borrowing less.30   Q3  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
a balanced budget.11 With monetary 
independence, policymakers are free to 
pursue goals such as low and stable in-
flation and not have to worry about us-
ing money growth to finance treasury 
budget deficits.  In this case, we would 
not expect a tight link between gov-
ernment budget deficits and inflation 
because current government budget 
deficits are expected to be largely offset 
by future government budget surpluses. 
In addition, the path of government 
budget surpluses is expected to offset 
changes in seigniorage, so that the 
intertemporal budget constraint holds. 
This does not mean that we may 
not observe some correlation between 
deficits and spending. For example, 
if the economy is hit by a recession, 
the deficit is likely to rise because tax 
revenues fall. At the same time, mon-
etary policymakers may lower interest 
rates to combat the recession, an act 
that may subsequently lead to higher 
inflation. In this case, though, deficits 
are not, per se, the cause of inflation. 
Rather, deficits and inflation are both 
consequences of the recession. 
 The alternative case is one in 
which monetary policy is dependent. 
When monetary policy is dependent, 
the central bank adjusts seigniorage 
so that the budget constraint holds. 
Monetary policy responds to fiscal 
policy, so that seigniorage revenue 
becomes an important component of 
government finance. An independent 
treasury might decide to run perma-
nent deficits, a situation that requires 
seigniorage to make up the gap be-
tween the value of the public debt and 
the present discounted value of budget 
surpluses. In this case, we could expect 
to see a link between deficits and 
inflation, since monetary policymak-
ers respond directly to a fiscal policy 
of deficit spending. Whether monetary 
policy is independent and fiscal policy 
is dependent or vice versa is the key 
to answering the question of whether 
budget deficits imply higher inflation. 
Dependent Monetary Policy May 
Result in Unexpected Outcomes. In 
a 1981 article, Thomas Sargent and 
Neil Wallace offer a famous example 
of how dependent monetary policy can 
lead to unexpected outcomes. Suppose 
fiscal policy is independent, monetary 
policy is dependent, monetary policy 
responds to fiscal policy, and the 
intertemporal budget constraint holds. 
In this case, an attempt by monetary 
policymakers to rein in inflation today 
by lowering money growth can result 
in higher inflation in the future: 
Policymakers are ultimately defeated 
in their efforts to lower inflation. How 
could this happen?
Suppose monetary policymak-
ers lower current money growth in an 
effort to bring down inflation. Lower 
money growth means lower seignior-
age. If government spending and taxes 
do not change, the government will 
have to borrow more from the public 
in order to make up for the lost rev-
enue from seigniorage. If the outstand-
ing public debt increases, the intertem-
poral budget constraint implies that 
there must be a corresponding increase 
in the present discounted value of fu-
ture budget surpluses and seigniorage. 
In a regime of fiscal independence, 
fiscal policy does not adjust, so the 
present discounted value of budget 
surpluses does not change. But that 
means that the present discounted 
value of seigniorage must rise to match 
the increase in the value of public 
debt outstanding. That is, the central 
bank will be required to increase the 
rate of money growth (seigniorage), an 
action that ultimately leads to higher 
inflation.12  In this case, efforts to use 




Economic theory suggests that the 
strength of the relationship between 
government budget deficits and infla-
tion depends on whether monetary 
policy is independent or dependent 
relative to fiscal policy. In countries 
where seigniorage is an important 
component of government finance, 
we are likely to find that govern-
ment budget deficits and inflation are 
empirically linked. In countries with 
independent monetary authorities, the 
link between deficits and inflation is 
likely to be weaker.  
Evidence for the U.S. Economy.  
As we can see from a plot of deficits 
and inflation for the U.S. economy 
since the end of World War II, there 
does not appear to be much of a rela-
tionship between government budget 
deficits and inflation (Figure 4). The 
contemporaneous correlation between 
federal budget deficits and inflation 
(GDP deflator inflation) is essentially 
zero. It is possible that deficits today 
are more highly correlated with future 
inflation than with current inflation 
— it may take some time for deficits to 
be felt in the form of higher inflation. 
But even if we look for the largest cor-
relation between current deficits and 
future inflation, we find that it is still 
rather low at 10 percent, when current 
deficits are correlated against inflation 
11 See Michael Dotsey’s article for more on inde-
pendent and dependent monetary policy.
It seems safe to say 
that, for the U.S. 
economy, there 
is little, if any, link 
between deﬁcits and 
inﬂation. 
12 There is a strong empirical link between mon-
ey growth and inflation for a wide range of
countries over a long span of time. See the ar-
ticle by George McCandless and Warren Weber.   Business Review  Q3  2005   31 www.philadelphiafed.org
six quarters ahead. It seems to be the 
case that for the U.S. economy, deficits 
and inflation are largely unrelated.
It seems safe to say that, for the 
U.S. economy, there is little, if any, 
link between deficits and inflation. 
The reason is that the Federal Reserve 
largely sets monetary policy indepen-
dently of what the Treasury is doing to 
finance the federal government budget 
deficit.  The Fed turns over its profit 
to the Treasury each year, but the Fed 
does not conduct monetary policy to 
raise revenue for the Treasury. Rather, 
the Fed focuses on stabilizing infla-
tion and unemployment and does not 
conduct monetary policy with an eye 
toward financing fiscal deficits.
More thorough evidence than 
simple correlations bears out the 
finding that deficits and inflation are 
weakly linked, if at all, in the U.S. and, 
for that matter, in most of the world’s 
advanced economies.13 However, there 
does seem to be a link between deficits 
and inflation in the world’s less-devel-
oped economies. For those countries, 
high inflation is often associated 
with high average government budget 
deficits.
Evidence for the Rest of the 
World. A recent study by Stanley 
Fischer, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos Vegh 
classified a sample of 94 countries 
into high-inflation and low-inflation 
countries. High-inflation countries, of 
which there were 24 in their sample, 
are those that experienced at least one 
episode of 12-month inflation exceed-
ing 100 percent over the span 1960 to 
1995. On average, inflation in those 
countries was a bit over 150 percent 
per year. Seigniorage as a fraction of 
FIGURE 4
Federal Deﬁcit and Inﬂation
Source: Haver Analytics
GDP averaged about 4 percent in high-
inflation countries versus an average of 
1.5 percent in low-inflation countries. 
High-inflation countries rely more on 
seigniorage to help finance govern-
ment spending. The authors find that 
for high-inflation countries, a worsen-
ing fiscal balance is much more likely 
to be accompanied by an increase in 
seigniorage than is the case in low-in-
flation countries.  
What triggers inflation?  The au-
thors use standard techniques to show 
that fiscal deficits lead to high infla-
tion when the government depends on 
revenue from seigniorage to finance 
debt. They find that for high-infla-
tion countries, a 10-percentage-point 
reduction in the fiscal balance (i.e., 
deficit) as a fraction of GDP is associ-
ated with, on average, a 4.2 percent 
increase in seigniorage. For low-infla-
tion countries, there is no significant 
link between deficits and seigniorage.  
Also, when high-inflation countries 
experience episodes of low inflation, 
the link between deficits and inflation 
weakens dramatically.
A 2003 study by Luis Catao and 
Marco Terrones uses a broader sample 
of 107 countries over the period 1960 
to 2001 to look for a link between fis-
cal deficits and inflation. They find a 
strong link between fiscal deficits and 
inflation in developing countries. For 
example, a 1 percent reduction in the 
ratio of the budget deficit to GDP is 
associated with an 8.75 percent lower 
inflation rate. Catao and Terrones also 
find results similar to those of Fischer, 
Sahay, and Vegh when the sample is 
broken into high-inflation and low-in-
flation countries using the 100 percent 
annual inflation rule. But they also 
find a statistically significant relation-
ship between deficits and inflation in 
countries with moderate inflation as 
well, though the link is weaker. For 
low-inflation and advanced countries, 
Catao and Terrones find no link be-
tween fiscal deficits and inflation.         
For developing countries, seignior-
age is a significant source of revenue, 
and fiscal policy appears to be an 
important ingredient for the amount 
of inflation. Indeed, over the period 
13 An older set of empirical studies tended 
to find that there was at best a tenuous link 
between deficits and inflation for the U.S. 
economy. See the papers by G. Demopoulos, 
G. Katsimbris, and S. Miller; K. Grier and 
H. Neiman; D. Joines; and Robert King and 
Charles Plosser. 32   Q3  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
We can express the consolidated budget constraint in the symbolic form:
it-1Bt-1+Gt = Tt+(Bt – Bt-1)+(Ht – Ht-1)
where Gt is government spending at time t, it-1Bt-1 is interest payments on publicly held government debt out-
standing, Tt is tax receipts, and Ht is high-powered money.  The left-hand side of the expression is total spending by the 
government and the right-hand side is total sources of revenue.  It is convenient to put the budget constraint in infla-
tion-adjusted, or real, terms by dividing through by the price level Pt. Define the real interest factor as 
      
We’ll use lower case to denote real values. Then re-arranging terms, we can write the consolidated budget con-
straint as:
(1+r)bt-1+gt=tt+bt+st
In this expression, tt is the real value of taxes collected, and st is the real value of the increase in money, or
seigniorage. Finally, (1+r)is the real interest factor on government debt, which we assume (for simplicity) is constant 
over time. If we iterate the budget constraint forward T times into the future, we get:
                                  
As long as the real amount of debt outstanding grows no faster than the real interest rate, which is a condition that 
says enough economic resources will be available to fully pay off any debt outstanding, then as T gets larger, the last 
term in the expression should get closer and closer to zero.  
  The first term on the left-hand side of the equal sign is the present discounted value of future budget surpluses. The 
second term is the present discounted value of future seigniorage. The equation shows that the real value of debt held 
by the public (principal and interest) is constrained by the government’s ability to raise revenue to pay it off.
1980 to 1995, seigniorage as a fraction 
of GDP averaged about 2.2 percent, 
compared with only 0.64 percent in 
advanced economies such as the U.S., 
Germany, and Japan.14 One possible 
reason for the greater reliance on seign-
iorage revenue in developing econo-
mies is that, for them, seigniorage may 
be a relatively efficient method to raise 
revenue compared with other forms 
of taxes. In developing countries, it 
may be difficult to collect tax revenue, 
since the tax base tends to be small 
and difficult to identify, especially 
when the government does not have a 
14 For more detail on seigniorage revenue in 
developing and advanced economies, see the 
article by Paul Masson, Miguel Savastano, and 
Sunil Sharma.
lot of resources to devote to building 
an efficient tax-collection system.    
SUMMARY
Monetary policy and fiscal policy 
are linked because money growth, 
in the form of seigniorage, provides 
revenue to the fiscal branch of the 
government. But whether deficits lead 
to inflation depends on the extent to 
which monetary policy is independent, 
that is, the extent to which monetary 
policymakers must react to fiscal 
financing developments when setting 
policy goals and implementing them.15 
For the U.S. economy, there is 
little evidence of a link between fiscal 
deficits and inflation, precisely because 
monetary policymakers have been free 
to pursue goals such as low and stable 
inflation. They are able to do this 
because fiscal policy is seen as sustain-
able, in the sense that deficit spending 
today is not expected to continue to 
the extent that monetary policy will 
have to provide major funding for the 
Treasury. This is largely the case for 
the developed countries of the world. 
Developing countries, however, often 
require revenue from seigniorage to 
meet their fiscal financing needs. 
Thus, these countries tend to show a 
strong link between fiscal deficits and 
subsequent inflation.     
15 We have focused on the possible inflation 
consequences of government budget deficits. 
Other questions of interest we have not ex-
plored include the impact of budget deficits on 
real interest rates and exchange rates.
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